Agreement; Jiten Chandra Ghosh Vs. Nipendra Chandra Ghosh [Calcutta High Court, 08-07-2016]

Agreement for Sale – Not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance as lacked readiness and willingness to perform under the agreement for sale.

# Agreement for Sale


IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side

Present : The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashis Kumar Chakraborty

Judgement on : 08.07.2016

S.A. No. 56 of 2009

Jiten Chandra Ghosh & Ors. Vs. Nipendra Chandra Ghosh

For the appellants : Mr. Priyabrata Ghosh; For the respondent : Mr. Partha Pratim Roy

Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J.

This second appeal, at the instance of the defendants in a suit for specific performance is against the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court, affirming the judgment and decree for specific performance passed by the learned trial Judge in favour of the respondent.

The relevant facts giving rise to the present appeal are stated hereinbelow. One Rama Prasad Ghosh, since deceased was the owner of various plots of land being Plot Nos. 222, 291, 438, 486, 490, 505, 526, 122, 130, 36, 38, 112, 367 of Khatian No. 69 Akri and Plot No. 357 of Khatian No. 27 Akri at Mouza- Mamudpur in the district of Murshidabad (hereinafter referred to as “the said properties”). In the year 1953, the said Rama Prasad died intestate, leaving behind his wife and three sons namely, Kesab, Jitendra and Nipendra. Since the said Rama Prasad Ghosh died before coming into force of the

# Hindu Succession Act, 1956

his said properties devolved upon his said three sons, each having one-third share therein.

In July 1988 Nipendra, the respondent in this appeal filed a suit, being Suit No. 132 of 1998 (subsequently renumbered as O.S. No. 42 of 1989) before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kandi, Murshidabad against his elder brother Jitendra, the appellant no. 1, claiming a decree for specific performance of an oral agreement for transfer of the entire one-third share of Jitendra in the said properties in his favour. The case set out in the plaint showed that according to the respondent, in the year 1985 an oral agreement was entered into between himself and appellant no. 1 whereby the latter agreed to transfer his entire one-third share in the said properties to him for Rs. 17,000/-. The respondent claimed that in terms of the said agreement for sale, on April 6, 1985 he paid Rs. 4,000/- to the appellant no. 1 as advance and thereafter by two instalments he paid a further sum of Rs. 6,000/- to the appellant. The respondent further alleged that, on June 21, 1988 when he offered the balance consideration of Rs. 7,000/- to the appellant no. 1 and called upon him to execute the necessary conveyance in his favour, the appellant no. 1 refused to accept the balance consideration and to execute the deed of conveyance in his favour.

The appellant no. 1, as the sole defendant contested the said suit. He filed his written statement alleging that he never agreed to sell his entire share in the said properties to the respondent; he only agreed to sell in Plot No. 490 of the said properties to the respondent at a consideration of Rs. 17000/-. He further alleged that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale of the said Plot No. 490 of the said property and in any event, he had sold Plot No. 130 of the said property to three persons namely, Ananda Gopal Mondal, Nanda Gopal Mondal and Nikhil Kumar Mondal for Rs. 10,000/- and in the absence of the said three purchasers who are necessary parties, the suit filed by the respondent was not maintainable.

On these pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed various issues, three of which were important for deciding this appeal. Those three issues were:

(1) whether in the absence of the subsequent purchasers the suit is bad for defect of parties;

(2) whether had agreed to sell his entire one-third share in the said properties to the plaintiff; and

(3) whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance.

Both the parties adduced oral, as well as documentary evidence through their respective witnesses before the learned trial Judge. By a judgment dated November 15, 1989, the learned trial Judge held that the said subsequent purchasers namely, Ananda Gopal Mondal, Nanda Gopal Mondal and Nikhil Kumar Mondal were not at all necessary parties and in their absence the suit was not bad for defect of parties; the appellant no. 1 had agreed to sell his entire one-third share in the said properties to the respondent and that the respondent was entitled to a decree for a specific performance. Thus, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. Jitendra, the appellant no. 1, then as the sole defendant challenged the said judgment and decree in appeal, being Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989, before the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Murshidabad. By the judgment dated February 5, 1994 the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Murshidabad upheld the findings of the learned trial Judge that the appellant no. 1 had agreed to sell his entire one-third share in the said family property to the respondent for Rs. 17,000/- and that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale. The learned Additional District Judge, however, held that the said subsequent pruchasers namely, Ananda Gopal Mondal, Nanda Gopal Mondal and Nikhil Kumar Mondal were necessary parties to the said suit, in their absence no effective decree could be passed in the suit, and the learned trial Court fell into an error to hold that the said subsequent purchasers were not necessary parties to the suit. Thus, learned Additional District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge, remanded the suit to the learned trial Court and granted opportunity to the respondent to implead the said subsequent purchasers as parties to the said suit and also granted liberty to the parties, including the said subsequent purchasers, to adduce fresh evidence in the suit. The respondent accepted the decision of the learned Additional District Judge in Title Appeal no. 138 of 1989 that the said subsequent purchasers were necessary parties to the said suit. After the suit was remanded to the learned trial Court, on November 29, 1995 the respondent amended his plaint by impleading the said subsequent purchasers as the defendant nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the said suit. The said subsequent purchasers, as the defendant nos. 2, 3 and 4 jointly filed their written statement and the learned trial Judge recasted the issues for decision of the said suit as follows:

1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and in law?

2. Has the plaintiff any cause of action to file this suit?

3. Is the plaintiff entitled to reliefs, as he prayed for?

4. To what other relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled?

Before commencement of the trial of the suit after remand the defendant no. 2, Ananda Gopal Mondal died and his two sons and one daughter who (who were minors and represented by their mother) and his wife were substituted in the suit as the defendant nos. 2(a) to 2(d).

The appellant no. 1, as the defendant no.1 and the other appellants, being the added defendants adduced evidence before the learned trial Court and they were also cross-examined. In his fresh evidence before the learned trial Judge after remand, the appellant no. 1 produced and proved a letter dated June 20, 1985 issued to him by the respondent which was marked as “Exbt.- B” on February 04, 2003. After considering all the evidence adduced by the respective parties to the suit, by the judgement dated January 22, 2004 the learned trial Judge decided all the aforementioned issues in favour of the respondent and passed a decree directing the appellant no. 1 to execute a sale deed in respect of his one-third share in the said properties in favour of the respondent after receiving the balance amount of Rs. 7,000/- within sixty days from that date. Against this decision all the appellants jointly filed an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 4 of 2004, before the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track, 1st Court, Kandi, Murshidabad. By the Judgment dated July 31, 2008, the learned first appellate Court held that since no appeal was filed against the said judgment and order of remand dated February 5, 1994 passed in the said Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989, there is no scope to go beyond the conclusion arrived in the said appeal, that the appellant no. 1 had agreed to sell his entire one-third share in the said family properties to the respondent at a price of Rs. 17,000/- and that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale. By the said judgment and decree dated July 31, 2008, the learned first appellate Court further held that the said subsequent purchasers, being the added defendants were aware of the agreement between the appellant no. 1 and the respondent and as such they are not entitled to claim benefit under

# Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

It is this judgment and decree dated July 31, 2008 passed by the learned first appellate Court which is challenged in this appeal by all the defendants.

At the time of admission of the second appeal the Division Bench of this Court framed the following to substantial questions of law:

a) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for specific performance of contract against the subsequent purchasers who acquired title before institution of the suit by overlooking the fact that he was added at least five years after the institution of the suit by virtue of the order of remand and thus, the suit was patently barred by limitation?

b) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in holding that the subsequent purchasers were not bonafide purchasers for value without notice by not at all discussing the substantive pieces of evidence adduced by the parties in this behalf?

When the appeal was taken up for hearing, considering the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and the respondent on April 15, 2016, this Court also framed the following third substantial question of law.

Whether in view of

# Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

the appellants can challenge the concurrent findings of both the learned Courts below, before remand, with regard to either the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff-respondent to perform his agreement or the agreement by the defendant no. 1 appellant to sell his 1/3rd share of the suit property to the plaintiff ?

Mr. Priyabrata Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that on July 07, 1988 the respondent filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale against the appellant no. 1 as the sole defendant and when by the earlier judgment and order dated February 5, 1994 passed in Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989, the learned first appellate Court set aside the judgement and decree dated November 15, 1989 and remanded the suit to the learned trial Judge after more than five years, and thereafter on November 29, 1995 the said subsequent purchasers, Ananda Gopal Mondal, since deceased, being the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 were impleaded as the defendants in the said specific performance suit. Thus, according to him in view of the provisions contained in sub-Section (1) of

# Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963

the suit as against the said subsequent purchasers, who all were necessary parties to the suit, were hopelessly barred by the laws of limitation. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the belated impleadment of the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 on November 29, 1995 did not cure the defect of the maintainability of the suit and in fact the suit itself was not maintainable. Thus , according to Mr. Ghosh, the learned Courts below erred in law is not dismissing the entire suit.

Without prejudice to the above contention, Mr. Ghosh further submitted that in view of the provisions in

# Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance must plead and prove that he has performed and has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He strenuously contended that in the present case, in his letter dated June 20, 1985 (Exbt.-“B”) the respondent expressly admitted his inability to pay the balance consideration to the appellant no. 1 and the contents of all the other letters of the appellant no. 1 to the respondent (Exbt. 2 series) considered by the learned Courts below in their respective judgements, also ex-facie disclose that in spite of repeated demands made by the appellant no. 1 in years of 1985, 1986 and 1987 the respondent was not at all ready and willing to perform the said agreement sale, as he lacked financial means to pay the balance consideration. Thus, he urged that the findings of both the learned Courts below that the respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation under the said agreement for sale to the appellant no. 1 is vitiated by perversity and consequently, the decree for specific performance passed by both the learned Courts below in favour of the respondent cannot be sustained in law. Mr. Ghosh also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of

# Ram Awadh vs. Achhaibar Dubey reported in AIR 2000 SC 860

and submitted that not only the appellant No. 1, the original defendant but also the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 as the subsequent purchasers are entitled to assail the decree for specific performance passed by the learned Courts below on the ground that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale. He strenuously contended that in the present case when the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement for sale, the learned Courts below fell into an error of law in not exercising their discretion under

# Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

to reject the prayer of the respondent for specific performance of the said agreement for sale.

However, Mr. Partha Pratim Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent first submitted that in the instant case the appellant no. 1 executed the sale deed in favour of the predecessor of the appellant no. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 on July 5, 1988, the respondent filed the suit for specific performance on July 7, 1988 and the said deed of sale dated July 5, 1988 was registered on July 7, 1988. According to him, when the sale deed dated July 5, 1988 was registered after filing of the suit by the respondent, the transfer of a portion of the said properties in favour of the appellant nos. 3 and 4 and the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d), is hit by the principle of lis pendens under

# Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

In support of such contention, Mr. Roy relied on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of

# Har Narain vs. Mam Chand reported in (2010) 13 SCC 128.

He further contended that since the transfer of a portion of the said properties in favour of the appellant nos. 3 and 4 and the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d), by the appellant no. 1 was during pendency of the suit filed by the respondent, sub-Section (2) of Section 21 of the Limitation Ac, 1963 comes into play and the suit against the appellant nos. 3 and 4 and the said predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) was not barred by the laws of limitation. He further contended that in any event, even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the suit filed against the said subsequent purchasers is barred by limitation the entire suit shall not fail and it is only the claim of the respondent against the portion of the suit properties against the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 shall not be maintainable.

Mr Roy next submitted that in the present case the appellant no. 1 did not assail the findings of the learned first appellate Court, in the first round, in the said judgment dated February 05, 1994 passed in Title Appeal no. 138 of 1989 that respondent, was ready and willing to perform the said agreement and, therefore, in view of sub-Section (2) of

# Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(hereinafter called as “the code”), in the present second appeal the appellants cannot assail the findings of the learned courts below that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale. In support of such contention, be relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of

# Nein Singh Vs. Knowarjee & ors reported in (1970)1 SCC 732

and

# Sitaram Goel Vs. Sukhnaudi Deyal reported in AIR 1972 SC 1612

He contended that the decision of the learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment refusing to entertain the challenge of the appellants with regard to the finding of the learned trial Judge in the judgement dated January 22, 2004 that the respondent was ready and willing to perform this said agreement for sale is not vitiated by any error of law.

In his reply, Mr. Ghosh submitted on behalf of the appellants that it is well settled principle of law that in view of

# Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908

a sale deed, after completion of registration relates back to the date of its execution. According to him, when the deed of conveyance was executed by the appellant no. 1 transferring the land at Plot No. 130 of the said properties to the subsequent purchasers on July 5, 1988 and the same was registered on September 22, 1988 though, after filing of the said suit for specific performance by the respondent, the doctrine of lis pendens shall not apply and, therefore, the submission made on behalf of the respondent that impleadment of the subsequent purchasers as the defendants in the suit shall not be barred by limitation in view of sub-Section (2) of Section 21 of the Limitation Act has no merit. In support of such contention, Mr. Ghosh cited a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of

# Smt. Sudama Devi and Ors. vs. Rajendra Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1973 Patna 199

Mr. Ghosh urged that as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Awadh vs. Achhaibar Dubey (supra) it is not only the transferor defendant, but also the subsequent purchaser of the property as the defendant in a suit for specific performance can contend and establish that the plaintiff has not fulfilled the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act with regard to his readiness and willingness to perform the agreement for sale. According to him, in the present case, the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 not being parties to Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989, can contend and establish in this second appeal that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement and that the finding of the learned Courts below, in the previous judgment of the learned trial Court dated November 15, 1989 as well as the judgment of the learned first appellate Court in the said Title Appeal No 138 of 1989 and the judgement and decree passed by dated January 22, 2004 the learned trial court after remand are all, on the grounds already urged by him vitiated by perversity, After conclusion of the hearing of the appeal while the decision of the appeal was awaiting, I came across a decision of the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of

# Hamda Ammal vs. Avadiappa Pathar reported in (1991)1 SCC 715

In the said decision of the Supreme Court held that in case of sale of an immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100/-, in view of Section 47 of the Registration Act a deed of conveyance of sale after its registration relates back to the date of its execution and an order of attachment passed in a suit filed subsequent to the execution of the conveyance but before the date of registration of the conveyance shall not affect the transfer of the property. Thus, I directed the matter to appear in my list on June 21, 2016 under the heading “To Be Mentioned” for drawing the attention of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties to the said decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal vs. Avadiappa Pathar (supra). On June 21, 2016 when the appeal appeared under the heading “To be Mentioned,” the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal (supra) was brought to the notice of Mr. Roy and Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and both of them agreed that the said decision of the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was not considered Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court while deciding the case of Har Narain Vs. Mam Chand (supra). Even in Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case Sudama Devi (supra), cited by Mr. Ghosh, Untwalia, J. (as His Lordship then was) also held that when a sale deed is executed prior to, but the same was registered during the pendency of the suit, in view of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 merely because it is registered subsequent to the filing of suit, the transfer cannot be said to be hit by the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. I am in respectful agreement with the said decision.

It is well settled law that if there are two Supreme Court decisions of varying import on the same point of law and when the latter judgement did not notice the previous view of a larger Bench, a Division Bench or a Single Judge of the High Court should follow the previous judgment. Authorities for this view can be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of

# Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal reported in AIR 1974 SC 1596

and

# Laxman Thamappa Kotgiri Vs. G.M. Central Railway & ors reported in (2007) 4 SCC 596

Thus, applying the ratio of the judgement of the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal Vs. Abadiappa Pathar (supra), I find that in the present case, though the deed of conveyance by the appellant no. 1 in favour of the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 was executed before the respondent filed the suit for specific performance and the registration of the said conveyance was completed after filing of the said suit, by virtue of the provisions in Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908, the transfer of a portion of the suit properties by the appellant no.1 to the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 was not a transfer during pendency of the suit, nor hit by the principle of lis pendens under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore , the submission made on behalf of the respondent that transfer of a portion of the said properties by the appellant no. 1 to that said predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3, and 4 was hit by the principle of lis pendens cannot be accepted. Consequently, in view of the provisions in sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the impleadment of the predecessor of the appellant Nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant Nos. 3 and 4, being the subsequent purchasers, as added defendants in the said suit for specific performance was barred by the law of limitation. Accordingly, the aforementioned first substantial question of law framed in the present appeal is answered in the affirmative. Now, by the judgement dated February 5, 1994 in Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989 the learned first appellate Court had held that the said subsequent purchasers were necessary parties to said suit and in their absence the suit was bad for non joinder of necessary parties. Therefore, since I have already held that impleadment of the subsequent purchasers as the defendant in the suit was barred by the laws of limitation, the entire suit filed the respondent fails. This view is fortified by the decision of the Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of

# Kanakarathanammal Vs. V.S. Loganatha Mudaliar & another reported in AIR 1965 SC 271

So far as the third substantial question of law, with regard to the objection raised on behalf of the respondent that in view of sub-section (2) of section 105 of the Code the appellants are not entitled to challenge the findings of the learned courts below that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale, considering the facts of the case I find substance in the argument advanced by Mr. Ghosh. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Awadh Vs. Achhaibar Dubei (supra), it is well settled law that even a subsequent purchaser in a suit for specific performance is entitled to put up a defence that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the agreement. Therefore, the subsequent purchaser as the defendant is also entitled to challenge a decree for specific performance on the ground that the finding with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the agreement for sale which vitiated by perversity or an error of law. As per sub-Section (2) of Section 105 of the Code, where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. In the present case, since the appellant Nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant Nos. 3 and 4, were not parties to the said Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989; they had no scope to challenge the judgment and order of remand dated February 5, 1994 passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The appellant Nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant Nos. 3 and 4 not being parties to the said Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989, are not bound by the findings of the learned Additional District Judge in the said judgment and order of remand dated February 5, 1994 and sub-Section (2) of Section 105 of the Code does not stand in their way to assail the findings of the learned Courts below that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement, on the ground of being vitiated by perversity. Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Nein Singh (Supra) and Sitaram Goel (supra) cited on behalf of the respondent cannot be applied in the present case to prevent the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 to challenge the findings of the learned Courts below that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale.

In the present case, the subsequent purchasers, as the added defendants filed there written statement in the suit and they raised a defence that the original defendant has already claimed that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the said agreement for sale. After the suit was remanded to the learned trial Judge the appellant no. 1 disclosed, proved and exhibited the letter dated June 20, 1985 as Exbt.- “B”. Even in the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appeal before the lower appellate Court, in Title Appeal no. 04 of 2004, the subsequent purchasers, as the appellants assailed the judgment and decree dated February 4, 2004 on the ground that the learned trial Judge did not consider the said letter dated June 20, 1985 (Exbt. B). In the said letter dated June 20, 1985 the respondent ex-facie admitted his financial incapability to pay the balance consideration money to the appellant no. 1 and stated that appellant no. 1 may sell his share in the said property, to any third party. From the various letters of the appellant no. 1 to the respondent written on various dates of 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 (which were marked as “Exbt. 2 series”) it is also evident that in spite of repeated demands made by the appellant no. 1, the respondent neither replied to the said letters, nor was he able to pay the balance consideration to the appellant no. 1. Further, in his examination-in-chief the appellant no. 1, as DW1 categorically stated that the respondent was not ready and willing to pay the balance consideration, but in cross-examination no suggestion was put to the DW 1, to dispute his said statement in examination-in-chief. For all these reasons, I find the contention raised on behalf of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4, as the subsequent purchasers that the findings of the learned Court below that the respondent was ready and willing to perform the said agreement is vitiated by perversity to be well founded and the same is accepted. Thus, the learned first appellate Court fell into an error in rejecting the contention of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 that the respondent was not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance as he lacked readiness and willingness to perform his obligation to the appellant no. 1 under the said agreement for sale.

In view my above findings with regard to first and third substantial question of law, the second substantial question of law framed in this appeal looses its significance and as such it is not necessary to deal with the said question.

For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal being S.A. No. 56 of 2009 is allowed. The judgements and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below stand set aside. The suit, being O.S. No. 42 of 1989 filed by the respondent stands dismissed.

However, there shall be no order as to cost.

The department is directed to forthwith send down the lower courts’ records to the learned Court below. If the appellants deposits the Special Messenger’s cost for transmission of the lower Courts’ record to the learned Court below within two weeks from date, the Department shall send down the lower Courts’ records through Special Messenger.

Let, urgent certified copy of this judgement be made available to the parties, subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.

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