Labour Law; Jayakutty A. Vs. State [Kerala High Court, 01-09-2016]

Labour Law; Jayakutty A. Vs. State [Kerala High Court, 01-09-2016]

Constitution of India – Employment – Mere fact that a person engaged on daily wage basis does not have a right to seek continued engagement or regularisation in service does not mean that such a person has no right whatsoever. The rights, if any, that accrue to him under the Industrial laws, can certainly be pursued by him through the adjudication mechanism contemplated in the said laws.

# Employment



W.P.(C).Nos.26884, 37185 of 2015 & W.P.(C).Nos. 2739, 2740, 2741, 2763, 2770, 2775, 4503 and 20011 of 2016

Dated this the 1st day of September, 2016










As all these writ petitions involve a common issue, they are taken up for consideration together and disposed by this common judgment.

2. The petitioners in these writ petitions are persons, who have been engaged on daily wage basis, as drivers, peons etc. under the respondent Panchayats. They have been engaged as such, for periods of varying lengths. In the writ petitions, it is their case that while they have been continuously engaged for the past many years, the respondent Panchayats have, now, by the decisions impugned in the writ petitions, decided to terminate their engagement and engage other persons, on daily wages, in their place. The petitioners contend that, by virtue of their long and continuous engagement, they have a right to be considered for regularisation, in service, or, in the alternative, a right to continued engagement till regular hands are appointed by the respondent Panchayats to the posts in question. It is also contended that the impugned decisions of the respondent Panchayats are vitiated by mala fides, since the decisions are politically motivated and designed to offer engagement to persons having particular political affiliations.

3. I have heard the respective counsel for the petitioners in all these writ petitions and the respective Standing counsel for the respondent Panchayats in these writ petitions. I have also heard the learned Government Pleader for the official respondents.

4. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the submissions made across the bar, it must be noted that, the issue as to whether a person, who is engaged in a temporary, contractual, casual or daily wage basis, has a legal right to be made permanent, in such employment, despite the fact that he has not been appointed in terms of the relevant Rules, came up for consideration before a five member Bench of the Supreme Court in

# Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1

The relevant observations by the Supreme Court in the said decision are as follows:

“43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as “litigious employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.

44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work” is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after Dharwad decision1 the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.

45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arm’s length—since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the department concerned on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.

49. It is contended that the State action in not regularising the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in tribunals and courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

50. It is argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the State in not making the employees permanent, would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. But the very argument indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Articles 14, 16 and 309 so as to ensure that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek employment. In the guise of upholding rights under Article 21 of the Constitution, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The acceptance of the argument on behalf of the respondents would really negate the rights of the others conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution. The argument that Article 23 of the Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to forced labour, cannot be accepted. After all, the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. It also appears to us that importing of these theories to defeat the basic requirement of public employment would defeat the constitutional scheme and the constitutional goal of equality.

51. The argument that the right to life protected by Article 21 of the Constitution would include the right to employment cannot also be accepted at this juncture. The law is dynamic and our Constitution is a living document. May be at some future point of time, the right to employment can also be brought in under the concept of right to life or even included as a fundamental right. The new statute is perhaps a beginning. As things now stand, the acceptance of such a plea at the instance of the employees before us would lead to the consequence of depriving a large number of other aspirants of an opportunity to compete for the post or employment. Their right to employment, if it is a part of right to life, would stand denuded by the preferring of those who have got in casually or those who have come through the backdoor. The obligation cast on the State under Article 39(a) of the Constitution is to ensure that all citizens equally have the right to adequate means of livelihood. It will be more consistent with that policy if the courts recognise that an appointment to a post in government service or in the service of its instrumentalities, can only be by way of a proper selection in the manner recognised by the relevant legislation in the context of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. In the name of individualising justice, it is also not possible to shut our eyes to the constitutional scheme and the right of the numerous as against the few who are before the court. The directive principles of State policy have also to be reconciled with the rights available to the citizen under Part III of the Constitution and the obligation of the State to one and all and not to a particular group of citizens. We, therefore, overrule the argument based on Article 21 of the Constitution.

52. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when they approach the court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent.

53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.

54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.”

5. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was followed in

# Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd.,  (2007) 1 SCC 408

wherein, referring to earlier decisions that suggested that daily wage employees may have a right to be continued in employment, beyond the period of their initial engagement, the court observed as follows:

“41. No doubt, in some decisions the Supreme Court has directed regularisation of temporary or ad hoc employees but it is well settled that a mere direction of the Supreme Court without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent. It is only where the Supreme Court lays down a principle of law that it will amount to a precedent. Often the Supreme Court issues directions without laying down any principle of law, in which case, it is not a precedent. For instance, the Supreme Court often directs appointment of someone or regularisation of a temporary employee or payment of salary, etc. without laying down any principle of law. This is often done on humanitarian considerations, but this will not operate as a precedent binding on the High Court. For instance, if the Supreme Court directs regularisation of service of an employee who had put in 3 years’ service, this does not mean that all employees who had put in 3 years’ service must be regularised. Hence, such a direction is not a precedent. In Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh18 the Supreme Court observed that only a statement of law in a decision is binding. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh19 this Court observed that everything in a decision is not a precedent. In Delhi Admn. v. Manohar Lal20 the Supreme Court observed that a mere direction without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 206, para 23)

“The decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the court, while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. … The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. The only thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided.”

Thereafter, sounding a note of caution, with regard to the role of courts in such matters, the court observed as follows:

“51. One may be very large hearted but then economic realities have also to be seen. Giving appointments means adding extra financial burden to the national exchequer. Money for paying salaries to such appointees does not fall from the sky, and it can only be realised by imposing additional taxes onthe public or taking fresh loans, both of which will only lead to additional burden on the people.

52. No doubt, Article 41 provides for the right to work, but this has been deliberately kept by the Founding Fathers of our Constitution in the directive principles and hence made unenforceable in view of Article 37, because the Founding Fathers in their wisdom realised that while it was their wish that everyone should be given employment, but the ground realities of our country cannot be overlooked. In our opinion, Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be stretched so far as to mean that everyone must be given a job. The number of available jobs are limited, and hence courts must take a realistic view of the matter and must exercise self-restraint.”

6. The distinction between the nature of rights accruing to a permanent employee and a temporary employee was discussed by the Supreme Court in

# Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 502

where, at paragraphs 78, 79 and 80, it was observed as follows:

“78. Normally, there are three kinds of posts that may exist in a cadre—(1) permanent posts; (2) temporary posts; and (3) quasipermanent posts. Accordingly, there can be a temporary employee, a permanent employee or an employee in quasi-permanent capacity.

79. In Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen this Court, while elucidating upon the distinction between temporary and permanent employees stated that such distinction is well settled. Whereas a permanent employee has a right to the post, a temporary employee has no right to the post. It is only the permanent employee who has a right to continue in service till the age of superannuation. As regards a temporary employee, there is no age of superannuation because he has no right to the post at all.

80. Thus it follows that for a person to have a right to the post, the post itself has to be a permanent post duly sanctioned in the cadre. The person should be permanently appointed to that post. Normally, it is only under these circumstances that such an employee gets a right to the post, but even when a temporary employee is appointed against a permanent post, he could get a right to the post provided he had at least acquired the status of a quasi-permanent employee under the relevant Rules. Where neither the post is sanctioned nor is permanent and, in fact, the entire arrangement is ad hoc or is for an uncertain duration, it cannot create any rights and obligations in favour of the appointees, akin to those of permanent employees.”

7. It might not be out of place to observe, at this juncture, that the mere fact that a person engaged on daily wage basis does not have a right to seek continued engagement or regularisation in service does not mean that such a person has no right whatsoever. The rights, if any, that accrue to him under the Industrial laws, can certainly be pursued by him through the adjudication mechanism contemplated in the said laws. By virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in

# Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496

it is clear that an adjudication of the rights guaranteed under the Industrial laws, can be pursued only before the Forums created under the said laws, and not before a civil court. In appropriate cases, therefore, where the employee is able to establish his case for the same, he can certainly seek the remedies such as retrenchment compensation for an unfair termination of his services/engagement.

On the facts of the instant writ petitions, it is clear that the petitioners were all engaged on daily wage basis. Inasmuch as it has been held by the decisions, referred above, that such persons do not have a right to continue in service, or for claiming regularisation in service, the prayer sought for in these writ petitions cannot be granted. Accordingly, without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners to pursue any claim that they may have, under the Industrial laws, before an appropriate Forum, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.


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