- Rahamtullah v. Secretary of State, (2013) 1 All ER 574
- Sadanandan v. Raghava Kurup, 1974 KLT 650
- In re Agar- ellis v. Lascelles, 1883 (24) Law Reports Chancery 317
- Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran, 1992 (1) KLT 729
- Sreekesh v. Mohammed Asharaf, 2003 (1) KLT 397
- Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran, 1992 (1) KLT 729
- Rajmohan v. State of Kerala, 2009 (4) KLT 466
- Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran, 1992 (1) KLT 729
- Sreekesh v. Mohammed Asharaf, 2003 (1) KLT 397
- Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ of Habeus Corpus – We cannot accept as a general principle that the parents are in all circumstances, bound to concede absolute decisional autonomy to their children, even if they have attained majority and remain helpless even in situations where their wards have taken wrong and immature decisions, which will be disastrous not only to the wards themselves but also to the family itself. Such parental authority should be out of bounds for a writ court, because it is exercised for the ultimate benefit of the ward.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
NTONY DOMINIC & ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JJ.
WP(Crl.) No. 39 of 2014
Dated this the 28th day of February, 2014
DR. LAL PARAMESWAR
BY ADVS.SRI.T.A.SHAJI (SR.) SRI.M.A.ASIF
1. ULLAS.N.N., THRISSUR
2. THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, IRINJALAKKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN 680121.
3. THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, IRINJALAKKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN 680121.
4. STATE OF KERALA,REPRESENTED BY THE HOME SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, SECRETARIAT THIRUVANANTHAPURAM PIN 695001.
R2-R4 BY ADV. ADDL.DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION SRI.K.I.ABDUL RASHEED R1 BY ADV. SRI.SHAJI P.CHALY R1 BY ADV. SRI.R.SANJITH
J U D G M E N T
Antony Dominic, J.
Petitioner is a doctor by profession, who is now working as medical officer in the District Hospital, Wadakkanchery. According to him, while working in the Elite Mission Hospital, Koorkancherry, he got acquainted with Ms. Greeshma Ullas (hereinafter referred to as the detenue for short) a doctor, who was then working in the hospital as a Resident Medical Officer. The relationship developed into a love affair and they decided to get married. However, this was not approved by the first respondent, the father of the detenue and that thereupon, the first respondent kept her in illegal detention, without even allowing her to report for work or to appear for the post graduate entrance examinations. It is stated that finally he received Ext.P1 letter from the detenue informing him about the illegal confinement and that her life is in peril. Thereupon this writ petition was filed seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the production of the detenue and to set her at liberty.
2. This Court admitted the writ petition and notice was issued to the respondents. In response, the first respondent, the father of the detenue, produced her before us on 31/1/2014. We interacted with her in detail and were prima facie satisfied that there is truth in the allegations of the petitioner. The outcome of our interaction with her was recorded in our order dated 31/1/2014, and the relevant part of it is extracted for easy reference;
“By order dated 27/1/14, this Court issued notice to the parties and also directed production of the detenue. Accordingly, the detenue was produced before us and we interacted with the detenue. In answer to our questions, she confirmed her love affair with the petitioner and also told us that it is her firm decision to get married to the petitioner. She also told us that in order to force her to withdraw from the relationship, for the last three months, she was kept in confinement without allowing her to continue the employment and even refusing to give the mobile phone, which she had. She also told us that all these facilities will be restored only if she agrees for a marriage with somebody else, which was not acceptable to her.
3. Accordingly, on the order of this Court, she was accommodated in a hostel, where she is continuing to stay. Parties also were allowed to give notice under the Special Marriage Act for getting their marriage registered.
4. Subsequently, the first respondent filed his counter affidavit, denying the allegation that he was illegally detaining the detenue and pleading that whatever he has done was for the welfare and well-being of his daughter and in exercise of his parental authority. He has averred in the affidavit thus;
Furthermore, I have found that, she was having more than three mobile phones out of which one mobile phone we could trace out from her room. On tracing the said mobile phone and seeing the continuous messages sent by my daughter on 19/11/13 to the petitioner I apprehend danger to her life if she is let free and the petitioner gets her custody. The messages sent by the alleged detenue reveals the antecedent character of the petitioner and his relationships with other girls. This was confirmed by the nature of replies sent by the petitioner on 19/11/2013.”
5. Further the messages exchanged between the petitioner and the detenue on 19/11/2013 from their mobile phones, have been annexed to the affidavit as Exts. R1(a) and R1 (b) and these messages read thus;
Ext.R1(a) (messages delivered to the petitioner by the detenue)
Njan onnumalla. Oru potti.big big fool..njan poyal lal parameswarinu nooru pere kittum. Continue ur old happy life..njoy..chathikkapettavarude listil oru penninte per kude.greeshma..its nothing.nthng new to u..as simple as tht.adutha penninod parayan oru silly kadha kude…
How can I trust one like u. Who cheated me even after getting that attached to me.even after realizing my love n me.howww.nthng s papam for u. in ur world.
What validity I have ? How long would u b able to continue with greeshma alone. Can u live a life with one woman.ever?
This answer has no value wen its frm a person like u. U need me.true. But ninak oru penninte kude oru life pattilya.u r moulded in separate mould.not a human.
How can I believe a dirty man like u. U dnt need a wife like me.lifetime vedhana ayirikkum ennepoloru barya anengil.y r u spoiling my life for u.enth theta njan cheythath…
I cnt observe u al d time. Veetil lock cheyth jeevipichal polum one like u vl cheat. Bcz ur mind s diseasd. That dirty.arappu thonnunnu for touching u.
Now u knw very well that v wont unite unless u remain ths pure..bcz endless pardonles sins u have done even to me..even cheating our gods. So u need to.bt once u get me u again bcm free n then u vl go bk.ur mind s that that impure n bad. U dnt knw sincerity.ne anganeya.i’m afraid of u. U want me to suffer n cry lifelong for a husband lik eu? Tel me
U love only u to the maximum.ur happiess.ur enjoyment alone.ask urself.can u remain pure ths lifetime as a single woman man.both by body mind n thots
Ask urself in front of all gods u beliv.never give selfish reply.if u had evr loved me.
Only a man who s that cruel can cheat one like me who loves n consider u as god..only lal could.
Ext.R1(b) (petitioner’s reply)
I had done orupaadu paapangal. Not doing it.And won’t do it ever.
Life long.For you and only for u. Trust.Truth. You want to leave me?
Cannot convince you.saralya.Ellam nte theta..Molutti I love you.And ini oru pennum ettante lifeil varilla. Angane onnum undavilya.I love you.Want to see you.
I need you. And I am trying to be perfect husband for you. Understand..I need our life.
I can remain pure as as a onewoman man.Trust me.
This life is over if you’re not there. Greeshma I’ll be good forever.Believe me.
I won’t disappoint you. Living as pure as I can be..i’ll live like this for the rest of my llife.”
6. It is also stated that based on the information gathered by his son from one Dr. George N.D., further enquiries were made and that he has found out that the contents of the messages are true. It is alleged that his son has also found out that the petitioner had relationship with at least 6 other women. He has also alleged that the petitioner had even attempted to assault not only himself but also the detenue and that too, in the premises of this Court. He has also contended that the detenue was working in the hospital only occasionally and that he did not prevent her either from reporting for work or appearing for the post graduate entrance examinations. According to him, he did not keep the detenue in illegal detention, but has in order to ensure her safety, removed the internal locks of her room and that she was always at liberty to move inside the house. In substance, what the first respondent contends is that he did not illegally detain his daughter, but has acted in her welfare, exercising his natural right as the parent of his only daughter.
7. All the allegations against him, including the veracity of the SMS messages extracted above, were denied by the petitioner in the reply affidavit filed by him. He has also reiterated his love and affection towards the detenue and their firm resolve to get married and live together as husband and wife. According to him, apart from the fact that he belongs to a different caste, there cannot be any other reason why their decision to get married should be opposed by the first respondent.
8. In the light of the above pleadings, materials and the submissions made by the counsel for both sides, who have reiterated their respective contentions, we have considered the matter.
9. The most important thing to be said about habeas corpus, sought for in this petition, is that the entitlement to the issue of the writ comes as a matter of right. Thus, if detention cannot be legally justified, entitlement for release of the detenue cannot be denied on other considerations, however important they may appear to be. Therefore, if the detention cannot be shown to be lawful, the detenue is entitled, without anything more, to have that unlawful detention brought to an end by obtaining a writ of habeas corpus and a feature of entitlement to the writ is the right to require the person who detains to give an account of the basis on which he says the detention is legally justified. ( See in this context
# Rahamtullah v. Secretary of State, (2013) 1 All ER 574
10. From what is pleaded by the first respondent, it is clear that though he has placed restraints on the absolute freedom of his daughter, according to him, he was justified in doing so, on account of his concern for her future welfare and well-being. His apprehensions in this behalf are on various grounds. But, to substantiate these, all that is made available to this Court are the text of the SMS messages that were exchanged between the parties on 19/11/2013. While in this context, we should also clarify that in the reply affidavit filed, the petitioner has disputed the authenticity of these messages. But, on 31/1/2014, when she appeared in Court, the detenue herself had confirmed the genuineness of the messages and according to her, these were their prankish acts, which were not to be taken seriously. Therefore in the light of the aforesaid statement made to us by none other than the detenue herself, we proceed on the basis that the messages in question were exchanged between the parties and that the petitioner’s dispute regarding its authenticity has no substance.
11. In the light of these facts and the basic principles that govern writ of habeas corpus, the primary question that is to be considered is, whether the facts of this case disclose an illegal detention of the detenue. As we have already stated, the 1st respondent, the father of the detenue, has put restraints on the freedom of his daughter, which, according to him, was necessitated for her welfare. According to him, the attempt of the petitioner is only to somehow or other get custody of the detenue and that having regard to his character and antecedents, he is apprehensive of her future welfare and well-being.
12. The first issue to be considered is whether having regard to the facts disclosed, it can be said that the apprehension expressed by the 1st respondent is a totally unfounded one to render the restraints put by him on the freedom of his daughter to be a detention which is illegal justifying the issue of a writ of habeas corpus.
13. We have already extracted the messages that were exchanged between the petitioner and the detenue. Reading of the messages sent by the detenue to the petitioner contained in Ext.R1(a) indicates that according to the detenue, despite the relationship that the petitioner has with her, simultaneously, he had relationships with other ladies as well. As a result, the detenue felt that he was a perfidious character who could not be faithful to her and that therefore, she could not trust him. In his replies, the petitioner did not deny the allegations made by the detenue and on the other hand, he was apologetic and promised to be loyal to her and not to repeat the past mistakes. In other words, these messages cannot be brushed aside as prankish acts, and instead prima facie show the anguish of the detenue, who felt of having been let down by someone dear to her. For the purpose of this case, it is not necessary for us to probe any more into the accuracy or otherwise of the allegations, for our enquiry is only on the limited question whether there is any basis for the apprehension entertained by the 1st respondent that his daughter’s future will not be safe in the hands of the petitioner. In our view, having regard to the contents of Ext.R1(a) and (b), it cannot be said that the apprehensions of the 1st respondent, the father of a grown up daughter, is totally baseless.
14. Having found so, the further question to be examined is what is the extent of a parent’s authority over a major daughter and whether the restraints put by a father on a major daughter, would in the circumstances, amount to an illegal detention, which is a pre-requisite for a writ of habeas corpus. The extent of parental authority over a major daughter came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in
# Sadanandan v. Raghava Kurup, 1974 KLT 650
That was a case where the petitioner therein claimed to have married the 3rd respondent, a 21 year old lady. According to him, his wife was illegally detained by her parents and with that allegation, he filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the judgment, referring to
# In re Agar- ellis v. Lascelles, 1883 (24) Law Reports Chancery 317
their lordships held that the three classes of cases in which interference with a father’s rights would be justified were summarised by the Chancery Division broadly as; (1) where the father has forfeited the right by his moral turpitude (2) where he has abdicated his authority, and (3) where he removes the ward out of jurisdiction. Thereafter finding that the case was one which revealed the picture of a woman subjected to the pulls and pressures of marital (or, may be extra-marital), attachment on the one side and parental affection or guidance on the other and taking into due account the rights and responsibilities which nature has entrusted to parents in regard to their children, their lordships held that they were not satisfied that any case of illegal detention or custody which calls for redress under Article 226 of the Constitution was made out. On that basis, the writ petition was dismissed.
15. A similar issue came up for the consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in
# Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran, 1992 (1) KLT 729
where the prayer was for the production of the daughter of the 1st respondent therein. It was alleged that they had entered into a registered marriage agreement and were living together. It was alleged that subsequently, with the intention to separate his wife from him, the 1st respondent had removed his wife and was keeping her in illegal detention against her will. In that judgment, the Division Bench considered the question whether custody of a parent in the circumstances pointed out, can be said to be unlawful warranting interference by this Court. This question was answered by the Division Bench in para 6 of its judgment thus;
The question involved in the case is regarding the custody of a girl, though, no doubt, according to the petitioner, she is a major. Even assuming that she is a major, the question is whether in such circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to maintain an application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the production of her body and also as to whether the custody of the father in such circumstances can be said to be unlawful. We do not think that having control and supervision of an aged girl by the parents will amount to illegal custody warranting the issue of a writ by this court. Parents will naturally be interested in the welfare of their children and unless there are extraordinary circumstances, normally they will be the proper persons to take decisions concerning the career and future of their children. Parents will be entitled to have control over the children, especially if they are daughters, to protect them from the vagaries of adolescence.
16. Similar issue again came up for consideration before another Division Bench of this Court in
# Sreekesh v. Mohammed Asharaf, 2003 (1) KLT 397
Here also, it was alleged that the petitioner and the major daughter of respondents 1 and 2 therein had entered into an agreement of marriage and were living together as husband and wife. According to him, while so, the parents and the relatives forcefully took away their daughter and admitted her in a counselling centre in order to compel her to change her attitude towards him. That was informed to the petitioner and she eloped with him from the counselling centre. Subsequently, on a complaint made by the father, the petitioner and his wife were arrested by the police. She was produced before the Magistrate and after recording her statement, she was allowed to live with the petitioner and they were living together. It was stated that subsequently with the consent of the petitioner, her father took his wife away from him and later refused to release her. When the complaints to the police did not yield any result, the writ petition was filed. The girl was produced before this Court and she was given time to think over the matter. Thereafter, when she was questioned, she said that she wanted to live with the petitioner.
17. In the above background, the case was considered and the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition holding thus;
7. It is seen that what has been produced as a proof of marriage is Annexure C, which is only an unregistered document. This document is titled as an agreement of marriage. According to us, there is no valid marriage between the petitioner and the third respondent. Can we say that the custody of the girl with the parents is illegal. The parents are entitled to have the custody of their children and in no circumstances, it can be said to be illegal, especially in the case of a girl. The parents have a duty to put their children in a correct pathway in their life. True that the third respondent has become major. But that does not mean that no duty is cast upon the parents to advise her on important matters. No doubt, the third respondent says that she legally lived with the petitioner. It is the case of the parents that the petitioner would not be able to look after her. Here, we find that there is no valid marriage. There is only an agreement in writing. That has no legal validity. It is the responsibility of the parents to see that the daughter is not cheated.
8. In the decision reported in
# Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran, 1992 (1) KLT 729
it was stated thus:
“It cannot be said that having control and supervision of an aged girl by the parents will amount to illegal custody warranting the issue of a writ by this Court. Parents will naturally be interested in the welfare of their children and unless there are extraordinary circumstances, normally they will be the proper persons to take decisions concerning the career and future of their children. Parents will be entitled to have control over the children, especially if they are daughters, to protect them from the vagaries of adolescence”. In this case, a subsequent affidavit has been filed by respondents 1 and 2 saying that after the third respondent’s education is over within three years, they will marry her to the petitioner, if she then wishes so at that time. 9. On a review of the entire facts and the law on this point, we don’t find any ground to release the third respondent from the custody of the parents and to handover her to the petitioner. Except a bald unregistered document, there is nothing to show that the petitioner has validly married the third respondent. The parents are allowed to take the third respondent with them to their house. The Police is directed to accompany the parents and daughter till they reach their house. We make it clear that we have never said that there can be no marriage between the petitioner and the third respondent. That decision to be taken by the appropriate parties. We have only said that the custody of the parents is not illegal.
18. These judgments certainly support the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that he was well within his parental authority to put restraints on the freedom of his daughter even if she has attained majority.
19. Counsel for the petitioner relied on another judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in
# Rajmohan v. State of Kerala, 2009 (4) KLT 466
That was a case where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed alleging that the petitioner’s wife was illegally detained by her parents. The Court found that there was no legal marriage. In spite of it, holding that the validity or otherwise of the marriage was not a matter of much relevance, the Division Bench held thus;
14. It is next contended that the 6th respondent being the father of the alleged detenu, has an unbridled right to keep her “in custody”. The keeping of an adult major woman in the custody of her parent even against her will and desire will not amount to improper restraint or detention/ confinement as to justify invocation of the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution, contends the learned counsel for the 6th respondent strenuously. The contention of the learned counsel for the 6th respondent virtually is that parental authority is sufficient to justify such “custody” even against the will and wishes of the detenu.
15. We are afraid that such a general principle of law cannot be accepted. A person who has attained majority, is in the eye of law, a person and a citizen entitled to all rights and privileges under the Constitution. There can be no question of an adult major woman being kept in the “custody” of anyone else against her wishes, desire and volition. Even if it be the parents, such custody cannot in the absence of better reasons be justified. There is no contention that she suffers from any debility which obliges her to be in the “custody” of any other. An adult major woman residing with parents or husband cannot be held to be in the “custody” of such parent or husband as to deny to her, her rights to decisional autonomy and to decide what is best for her. Parental authority would certainly extend until a child attains majority. But, thereafter, though the parent and the child may be residing together, it can never be held that such child is in the “custody” of the parent. An adult major woman is not a chattel. The theory that until marriage a woman must be under the custody and confinement of her father and thereafter in the custody and confinement of her husband cannot possibly be accepted in this era. Such an adult person is certainly entitled to take decisions which affect her. Parental authority or matrimonial authority will not at any rate give right to such parent or husband to keep such woman under restraint, confinement or detention against her will. The parent may feel that he has the monopoly for taking correct decisions which concern his daughter, but that impression of a doting patriarchal parent cannot blindly be accepted and swallowed by a Court. The parental authority may extend to advice, counsel and guidance. But certainly, it cannot extend to confinement, detention or improper restraint against the wishes and volition of the adult major daughter. Right to take decisions affecting her will certainly have to be conceded to her even assuming that, decisions taken may at times or in the long run prove to be not wise or prudent.
16. In this context, the learned counsel for the 6th respondent places reliance on two decisions of the earlier Division Benches of this Court in
# Prasadhkumar v. Ravindran, 1992 (1) KLT 729
# Sreekesh v. Mohammed Asharaf, 2003 (1) KLT 397
17. We have been taken through the decisions in detail. We are unable to agree that they lay down a proposition that under no circumstances, when there is an allegation that parental authority is invoked to justify improper restraint or confinement/detention powers under Art. 226 cannot be invoked. It depends on the facts of each case. Merely because beneficent parental authority is exercised over an adult child, this Court will not invoke its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. Sagacity and judicial wisdom are required to identify the fit cases in which such jurisdiction can, need or need not be invoked. The observations in those decisions will have to be understood carefully and cautiously. It would be myopic and obscurantist to understand those observations as sufficient to concede to the parent a right to deny liberty and freedom to his adult daughter and to move her out of the country against her will keep her away from the Court before which proceedings are initiated. We are unable to so understand those observations. Home and parental authority are not out of bounds for a constitutional court while performing its duty to translate the constitutional promise of freedom and liberty and while responding to the prayer of a citizen who has come to court complaining about negation of such rights, in exercise of his fundamental constitutional right to move the court for enforcement of such right.
18. This Court comes across many such cases of alleged detentions/ confinement/ compulsive restraint placed on adult daughters by parents. We have taken a consistent stand that the decisional autonomy of such an adult daughter will have to be respected. An adult woman cannot be treated as chattel by this Court. Her rights as an equal citizen will have to be respected and cannot be denied. In cases where we feel that the decision of such alleged detenue does not appear to be voluntary and genuine, we resort to the course of granting them time to reflect, contemplate and ponder. We give them opportunity to be accommodated in neutral venues for some period to facilitate rational and dispassionate evaluation – sometimes for long periods. We give parents opportunity to counsel their children during such period. But ultimately, we do respect the decisional autonomy of such adult children. We are convinced that, that is the proper course to be followed in all cases. To do otherwise would simply be denial of human rights of an adult woman to take decisions affecting her future. That would certainly be denial of the right to life guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. The mere fact that the decision may turn out to be incorrect, or bad does not justify the denial of the right to take a decision. We do not permit our concepts of what is right and good for them to override their own assessment of what is right and good for them. We do not permit the concept of others (including parents) of what is right and good for them to override their own concepts. Concept of right and good may vary with the times. This generation’s concept of right and wrong may not find acceptance with the next. No generation or parent can claim infallibility and enforce its/his concept of right and wrong on the succeeding. Suffice it to say that we do not agree with the learned counsel that Prasadhkumar and Sreekesh (supra) concede to the parents any unbridled rights to usurp the decisional autonomy of their adult daughters and keep them in “custody” against their desire in exercise of their parental authority or duty. We do not agree that the said decisions lay down that this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India in such a situation. We do not agree that the mere fact that the petitioner’s marriage with the alleged detenu may not be strictly legal is sufficient to deny relief. At least it can be said that in the present era of social and societal development in this State such understanding of the dictum is impermissible. In the peculiar facts of those cases and to cater to the interests of justice in such situations, the Courts had followed such courses while considering invocation of the jurisdiction under Art.226.”
20. Having considered the Division Bench judgment in Rajmohan‘s case (supra), we find ourselves unable to follow the principles laid down therein. First of all, the facts of that case is totally incomparable to the facts of this case. That apart, the attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Sadanandan‘s case (supra). A judgment rendered in ignorance of a binding precedent could be treated as per incuriam and is not a binding precedent. Further, the Apex Court in
# Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625
“A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a man to obtain possession of a woman alleged to be his wife does not issue as a matter of course. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course especially when a man seeks the assistance of the Court to regain the custody of a woman. Before a Court accedes to this request it must satisfy itself at least prima facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact the husband and further whether valid marriage between him and the woman could at all have taken place.”
It was ignoring the above principles that the Division Bench in para 13 of the judgment held that the question in the petition is not about the validity of the marriage and proceeded to grant relief on the erroneous reasoning that in petitions for habeas corpus, strict doctrine of the rule of locus standi can be ignored. This approach, in our view, is unacceptable. Even apart from all these, unlike this case, in Rajmohan’s case (supra), since the parent had removed the ward out of the jurisdiction of this Court, in such a case, as held by the Full Bench in Sadanandan’s case (supra), interference with parental authority was justified.
21. We agree that like in any other sphere of life, there has been changes in the social and moral values. Ours is a society which has recognised freedom to every citizen. But then, these changes that we proudly talk about, and the liberties that are guaranteed to our citizens, cannot be stretched beyond limits nor can such freedom be made weapons to destroy our fundamental values or social establishments like families, which, undoubtedly, concede authority on parents to advise and guide their children. We cannot accept as a general principle that the parents are in all circumstances, bound to concede absolute decisional autonomy to their children, even if they have attained majority and remain helpless even in situations where their wards have taken wrong and immature decisions, which will be disastrous not only to the wards themselves but also to the family itself. Such parental authority, except in cases such as those pointed out by the Chancery Division and approved in Sadanandan’s case, should be out of bounds for a writ court, because it is exercised for the ultimate benefit of the ward. It may be to the dislike of the ward, who may resist it and even turn hostile to the parents. But, such immature reactions should not be allowed to influence our judgment, since the ultimate aim and purpose of all these exercise is the welfare of the ward. This Court therefore should, except in extra ordinary situations, loathe interference in cases where the natural parental authority is exercised to the dislike of a lover or even the ward. For these reasons, we find ourselves unable to follow the judgment in Rajmohan‘s case (supra) and would follow the earlier judgments.
22. Having regard to the facts involved and the binding legal principles discussed above, we hold that the facts of this case do not disclose any illegal detention entitling the petitioner for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.