16. It is settled principle of law that in India theory of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” is not applicable and the Court is duty bound to extract the truth from the statements of the eye-witnesses. Only on the basis of some contradiction in the statements, with regard to some accused, the whole statements cannot be thrown out. For this, reliance may be placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kalegura Padma Rao and another v. The State of A.P., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1299, wherein it has been held as under :-

“To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) and Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76). Stress was laid by the accused- appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called ‘a mandatory rule of evidence’. (See Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 366).”

17. It is proved beyond doubt that the appellant Balram Singh gave a blow of axe on the head of Ramsingh as a result he received one lacerated wound on the left parietal region and fracture was found there.

18. Learned counsel for the appellants have also submitted that it is alleged against the appellant Balram that he has assaulted by axe on the head of the deceased Ramsingh but no incised wound was found due to impact. However, since the deceased Ramsingh had a Safi then it is possible that sharp edge of axe could not make its impact of sharp edge on the skin or it is possible that axe of Balram Singh was not so sharp and, therefore, lacerated wound could be caused. Hence, the injury clearly indicates that it could be caused by an axe wherein edge of axe was not sharp. Under these circumstances, the medical evidence completely supports the version of eye-witnesses and it is proved beyond doubt that the appellant/accused Balram Singh gave a blow of axe on the left frontal parietal region on the head of the deceased Ramsingh.

19. Learned counsel for the appellant have also submitted that when the incident took place, the appellants had no reason to kill the deceased Ramsingh. Though it is alleged that they suddenly attacked upon him. However, it is mentioned by all the eye-witnesses that after hearing the shouts of Bablu, they reached on the spot where quarrel took place between the appellants and Bablu. Hence, it is submitted that the appellants were not at all interested to cause the death of the deceased Ramsingh. It would be apparent that the appellant Balram gave a single blow on the head of the deceased Ramsingh and he did not repeat the assault. Therefore, it would be apparent that he assaulted on the vital part of the deceased Ramsingh but avoided repetition whereas it cannot be said beyond doubt that the appellants were interested to kill the deceased Ramsingh.

20. Though the charges of Section 34 of IPC were framed against both the appellants but their act appears to be individual and, therefore, the appellant Raghunath shall not be convicted of offences under Sections 302 or 304 (Part-II) of IPC for the death of the deceased Ramsingh. From the prosecution story, it is clear that the incident has taken place, all of sudden, and the appellants/accused were not having any intention for causing death of the deceased Ramsingh.