16. The Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 has held as under :
“28. We have found that in certain cases, the High Courts have accepted the compromise between the parties when the matter in appeal was pending before the High Court against the conviction recorded by the trial court. Obviously, such cases are those where the accused persons have been found guilty by the trial court, which means the serious charge of Section 307 IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt at the level of the trial court. There would not be any question of accepting compromise and acquitting the accused persons simply because the private parties have buried the hatchet.
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29.7.While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
17. Thus, once a person is convicted, then he cannot be acquitted on the basis of compromise. Accordingly, the prayer of the Counsel for the appellant to acquit the appellant on the basis of compromise cannot be accepted and hence, rejected.
18. It is next contended by the Counsel for the appellant that the factum of compromise can be considered while determining the question of sentence.
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Mukesh Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2013) 11 SCC 511 has held as under :
“8. The Court has not sentenced the appellants to imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC separately as the sentence awarded for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC was considered enough. The fact, however, remains that the appellants stand convicted for a non-compoundable offence. The settlement/compromise and the prayer for composition based on the same, therefore, remains inconsequential in the light of the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal v. State of J&k [(1999) 2 SCC 213 ] where this Court has held that an offence can be compounded only if it is compoundable no matter the court may (sic) take into consideration the settlement between the parties while awarding sentence to the appellants. The following passage is apposite in this regard: (SCC p. 214, paras 3-5)
“3. … Section 320 which deals with ‘compounding of offences’ provides two Tables therein, one containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it, and the other containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and none else.
Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes a legislative ban in the following terms:
‘320. (9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.’ 4. It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand [ 1990 Supp SCC 681] was rendered, the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was the attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu [(2005) 1 SCC 347] drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable, even with the permission of the court cannot be compounded at all. The offence under Section 326 IPC is, admittedly, non-compoundable and hence we cannot accede to the request of the learned counsel to permit the same to be compounded.
5. However, considering the fact that the parties have come to a settlement and the victims have no grievance now and considering the further fact that the first appellant has already undergone a period of imprisonment of about six months, a lenient view can be taken and the sentence can be reduced to the period which he has already undergone. We order so and direct the jail authorities to set him at liberty forthwith.”
20. The Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 13 SCC 311 has held as under :
“13. We must immediately state that the offence under Section 307 is not compoundable in terms of Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and, therefore, compounding of the offence in the present case is out of question. However, the circumstances pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel do persuade us for a lenient view in regard to the sentence. The incident occurred on 17-5-1991 and it is almost twenty years since then. The appellants are agriculturists by occupation and have no previous criminal background. There has been reconciliation amongst parties; the relations between the appellants and the victim have become cordial and prior to the appellants’ surrender, the parties have been living peacefully in the village. The appellants have already undergone the sentence of more than two-and-a-half years. Having regard to these circumstances, we are satisfied that ends of justice will be met if the substantive sentence awarded to the appellants is reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining the amount of fine.”